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NOTE
A BRIDGE TOO FAR: THE SUPREME COURT
OVEREXTENDS THE ANTI-RETALIATION
PROVISION OF TITLE VII
Nicholas Villani+
Cynthia Richardson filed racial discrimination charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in response to racial
discrimination she experienced at work,' but it was only the beginning of
her troubles.2 Richardson subsequently found horse manure in her park-
ing spot, was hit with a rubber band while riding the bus with co-workers,
found her car scratched in the employee parking lot, and found hair in
her food on four separate occasions.3
Title VII of the landmark Civil Rights Act 4 prohibits employment
+ B.A., James Madison University, 2004; J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The Catholic
University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author thanks Professor Leroy
Clark for his expert assistance and Jen for her unconditional love and support.
1. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426,433-34 (2d Cir. 1999).
2. Id. at 435 ("Richardson contends that ... she was again harassed because of her
race, and furthermore was retaliated against for having complained about the discrimina-
tion she [previously] encountered ....
3. Id.
4. According to Professor Mack A. Player, "[t]he legislative history of Title VII is
perhaps the most unusual of any modern statute." MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.03, at 201 (abr. student ed. 1988). An early draft of the bill
stipulated only a weak enforcement body with little power past employment conciliation.
Id. Additionally, there was no protection for employment discrimination based on sex. Id.
Interestingly, the House Rules Committee chairman offered an amendment to add sex as a
protected class "'in a spirit of satire."' Id. (citation omitted). Despite the chairman's sa-
tirical intent, the amendment was adopted "with little debate." Id. The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act amended Title VII in 1972, and provided more liberal procedural
measures and greater enforcement powers for the EEOC. See id. § 5.03, at 202.
As a practical matter, one should be aware of the nomenclature of Title VII statutory
provisions. Id. § 5.01, at 199 n.1. Due to the cumbersome numbering conventions of the
United States Code, many courts, enforcement agencies, and practitioners refer to the
section of the Act as opposed to the formal United States Code section. Id. Thus, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e is referred to as section 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 is referred to as section
702, and so on. Id. Thus, the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a)) is commonly referred to as section 704. Id.
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discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, or religion.5 Ad-
ditionally, Title VII outlaws retaliation against employees who contest
these prohibited forms of discrimination.6 Clear cases of retaliation exist
when the employer terminates the employee or reduces the employee's
salary in response to the employee taking protected actions under Title
VII.7  Beyond these so-called "'ultimate employment decisio[ns],"" the
law is less clear in determining what constitutes a retaliatory adverse em-
ployer action.9 The Supreme Court attempted to clear up any misconcep-
tions when it granted certiorari to Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Rail-
way v. White."°
The harm Richardson suffered following her EEOC complaint was ob-
jectionable," but should it give rise to an action against her employer? In
Richardson's case, the Second Circuit determined that although the
harms suffered were personal and came from co-workers, the "unchecked
retaliatory co-worker harassment" was sufficient to constitute retaliatory
adverse actions by the employer under Title VII.'
2
The Title VII provision in question prohibits an employer from dis-
criminating against employees or applicants for their opposition to, or
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act addresses dis-
crimination in employment settings. See PLAYER, supra note 4, § 5.01, at 199. Title VII
regulates relationships between employers and their employees as well as job applicants.
Id. Additionally, Title VII covers unions and employment agencies. Id. Individuals cov-
ered under the Act and subjected to such discrimination may file complaints with the
EEOC and seek a remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
6. § 2000e-3(a). Since employees who report employment discrimination face the
prospect of retaliation from their employer, the purpose of Title VII shows a general em-
phasis on protecting employees from discriminatory workplace conditions, while the re-
taliation provision of Title VII serves to specifically retain uninhibited access to the protec-
tions provided in Title VII through the proscription of employer retaliation. See id. Title
VII provides secondary protection to employees who take advantage of discrimination
protections by outlawing additional discrimination against employees for "making charges,
testifying, assisting, or participating in [Title VII] proceedings." Id.
7. § 2000e-2 ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation ...."); see also Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 88 (1st Cir.
2005) ("Typically, an adverse employment action involves a discrete change in the terms
and conditions of employment.").
8. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White (Burlington III), 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410
(2006) (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702,707 (5th Cir. 1997)).
9. See Charles Lane, High Court Weighs Retaliation at Work; Harassment-Case Stan-
dard Unclear, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at A4 (attributing the following statement to an
attorney for Burlington Northern, "unless the court clarifies the legal standard, 'any act of
retaliation, no matter how trivial' . . .could trigger a lawsuit").
10. Burlington III, 126 S. Ct. at 2410-11.
11. See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426,435 (2d Cir. 1999).
12. Id. at 446-47.
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complaint of, an unlawful employment practice." Thus, Title VII pro-
tects two forms of employee action: participation and opposition.1
4
Title VII protects against both retaliation based on the invocation of
Title VII protections and participation in Title VII proceedings, and re-
taliation based on an individual's opposition to illegal practices under
Title VII."5 First and foremost, employees who participate in Title VIIS 16
actions receive very broad protections. According to Professor Mack A.
Player, "[a]ctions classified as 'participation' in Title VII proceedings
receive complete protection against work-place retaliation regardless of
the merits of the charge or accuracy of any statements or allegations
made by the individual as part of the proceedings."' 7  Additionally, em-
ployees who oppose illicit employment discrimination also receive protec-
tion.' The retaliation provisions of Title VII extend to individuals oppos-ing what they perceive to be illegal employment discrimination.' 9 This
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). The statute reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment
agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against
any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof
or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing un-
der this subchapter.
Id.
Retaliation claims under Title VII "have doubled in the last 10 years, now accounting
for some 30 percent of the [EEOC's] docket." Linda Greenhouse, Justices Weigh Whether
Railroad Retaliated Against Worker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2006, at A24 (recounting claim
made by Burlington Northern's attorney during oral arguments before the Supreme
Court); see also Lane, supra note 9 ("Charges of unlawful retaliation under Title VII
nearly doubled between 1992 and 2005, from 10,499 to 19,429. They account for a quarter
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's caseload.").
14. See PLAYER, supra note 4, § 5.27, at 269-70.
15. Id.
16. Id. § 5.27, at 272. Under participation, the parties charging employment discrimi-
nation receive protection, as well as anyone who testifies or provides information in a Title
VII proceeding. Id. This extends to:
[AIlI aspects of the official proceedings under Title VII: filing the initial charge, giving
solicited or unsolicited information to EEOC agents, filing judicial complaints, giving
statements to attorneys, providing information in pre-trial discovery, and trial testi-
mony. Virtually all communications with enforcement agencies will be considered
"participation" if the communication relays information or requests advice.
Id.
17. Id. § 5.27, at 271.
18. Id. § 5.27, at 273. According to Professor Player, "[i]n this way, [the employment
retaliation provision of the statute] extends Title VII beyond protecting classes, such as
race, sex, national origin, and religion, to the protection of activity." Id.
19. Id. § 5.27, at 275. Although the protection for opposition is qualified, Professor
Player still sees rather broad protections:
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protection, however, only extends to those who oppose "practices which
reasonably appear ... to violate Title VII.
°20
Prior to Burlington, the federal appellate courts were split on the issue
of what constitutes a retaliatory adverse employment action.2' The split
resulted from judicial struggles in deciphering what constitutes "an em-
ployment decision or action disadvantaging the plaintiff."" Regarding
retaliation, the statute refers only to retaliatory "discrimination" without
defining what activities meet this standard.3
Some circuits took a strict approach, interpreting Title VII retaliation
protections to apply only to "ultimate employment decisions." 24 Other
circuits used an intermediate approach to apply retaliation protections
when the "'terms, conditions, or benefits"' of employment had been af-
fected.2 The majority of circuits, however, applied a broad approach in
determining what is considered retaliation.26
This Note will first explore the merits of the various approaches to re-
taliatory adverse employment actions. Then, this Note will analyze the
efficacy of the various models used in interpreting claims of retaliatory
adverse employment action. Next, this Note will examine the Supreme
Opposition protected by [the Title VII retaliation provisions] can take virtually any
form: oral complaints to management officials; circulating, signing or presenting writ-
ten petitions; concerted withholding of services, that is, striking; picketing the em-
ployer's premises; statements to the media or third parties; filing complaints with un-
ions, private civil rights organizations, or government agencies charged with mediat-
ing civil rights disputes. ... It is enough that the individual objects to the fairness of
the treatment, which treatment might be perceived as violating Title VII.
Id.
20. Id. § 5.27, at 274.
21. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 89 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting a broad
approach with a "severe or pervasive" test); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865
(4th Cir. 2001) (using a "terms, conditions, or benefits" test); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d
1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting a broad approach with a deterrence test); Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (recognizing an "ultimate employ-
ment decision" test).
But see Shannon Vincent, Comment, Unbalanced Responses to Employers Getting Even:
The Circuit Split Over What Constitutes a Title VII-Prohibited Retaliatory Adverse Em-
ployment Action, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 991, 1009 (2005). This approach suggests that
all ultimate employment decisions would establish retaliation, and non-ultimate employ-
ment decisions should be subjected to a sliding scale test on an ad hoc basis. Id. The
courts would consider the severity of the employment action as well as the potential for
such actions to limit employees' willingness to take actions protected under Title VII. Id.
Regarding co-worker retaliation, an employer would be held liable if the employer had
knowledge of the harassment and yet did nothing to address the retaliation. Id.
22. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 443 (2d Cir. 1999)
(describing the elements of a retaliation claim).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
24. See, e.g., Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
25. See, e.g., Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865.
26. See, e.g., Noviello, 398 F.3d at 89-90.
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Court's decision in Burlington. Ultimately, this Note will argue that
courts should exercise restraint in applying Burlington to Title VII re-
taliation cases in order to avoid opening the floodgates and encouraging
frivolous Title VII retaliation claims for trivial harms and slights. This
Note argues that such an approach serves the interests of employees as
well as employers, while maintaining the spirit of Title VII retaliation
protections.
I. INTERPRETATION OF ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION VARIED
AMONG THE CIRCUITS: CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO
BURLINGTON
A. Preliminary Matters: Burden-Shifting Analysis Applicable to Title VII
Claims
In any Title VII action, courts apply a burden-shifting standard. 27 First,
"[t]he complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under
the statute of establishing a prima facie case of.. . discrimination. "28 This
burden involves a three-step process,29 which requires the complainant to
show "(1) participation in a protected activity that is known to the defen-
dant, (2) an employment decision or action disadvantaging the plaintiff,
and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the ad-
verse decision.,
30
After a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, "[t]he burden then
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason" for the adverse action." If the employer makes a sufficient
showing, the burden again shifts, and "the plaintiff must demonstrate that
there is sufficient potential proof for a reasonable jury to find the prof-
fered legitimate reason merely a pretext for impermissible retaliation."32
27. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
28. Id.
29. See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 443 (2d Cir. 1999)
(outlining the three-part test). For a critique of judicial approaches to this process under
Title VII, as well as other similar acts, see Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman,
Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees,
Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 Mo. L. REv. 115, 151 (1998) ("As they are
wont to do, courts have taken what began as a straightforward, three-element test for
actionable retaliation and turned it into a labyrinth of conflicting decisions and poorly
defined required showings.").
30. Richardson, 180 F.3d at 443; see also Ann Clarke Snell & Lisa R. Eskow, What
Motivates the Ultimate Decisionmaker? An Analysis of Legal Standards for Proving Causa-
tion and Malice in Employment Retaliation Suits, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 381, 413 (1998) (urg-
ing courts to utilize a two-step process in analyzing the "causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse action of the ultimate decisionmaker").
31. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
32. Richardson, 180 F.3d at 443.
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B. Strict Interpretation of Title VII Only Protected Employees Against
"Ultimate Employment Decisions"
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits adopted a stringent standard for deter-
mining what action constitutes retaliatory adverse employer conduct.33
This strict approach limited actionable conduct to "ultimate employment
decisions." 34 Ultimate employment decisions were defined "'as hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating.'
35
The Fifth Circuit adopted a strict approach for retaliatory adverse em-
ployer actions in Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., where an employee filed
a Title VII sexual harassment charge with the EEOC.36 Following the
complaint, the employee began to experience hostility from co-workers,
lost property at work, and received negative employment evaluations.37
The court decided that "'Title VII was designed to address ultimate
employment decisions, not... every decision made by employers that...
might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.' 38 Ul-
timate employment decisions are actions "'such as hiring, granting leave,
discharging, promoting, and compensating.' ' 39 The court found that the
33. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997); Ledergerber
v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997).
34. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707 (citing Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir.
1995)). According to the Fifth Circuit, Congress intended Title VII to deal with ultimate
employment decisions, as opposed to employer actions only tangentially related to those
ultimate employment decisions. Id. (citing Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781-82). The Eighth Circuit
also believed Title VII remedies should be limited to ultimate employment decisions, and
actions with only a tangential effect on employment do not qualify. Ledergerber, 122 F.3d
at 1144 (citing Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994)).
35. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707 (quoting Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781-82).
36. See id. at 704.
37. See id. at 705-06. The alleged retaliation involved co-workers ignoring the em-
ployee and making snide remarks; tools stolen from the employee's work locker without
recourse from management; and increasingly negative employment reviews, which caused
the employee to miss a raise in pay. Id.
38. Id. at 707 (quoting Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781-82). The court recognized that "the anti-
retaliation provision [of Title VII] states that employers shall not 'discriminate' against
employees for taking action protected by Title VII." Id. at 708 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) (2000)). To discern what Congress meant when using the term "discriminate" in the
anti-retaliation section, the court looked to the preceding section of Title VII. Id. at 708.
The court observed broad protections under § 2000e-2(a)(2), which makes it unlawful "to
limit, segregate, or classify... employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect... status." § 2000e-2(a)(2); Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709. The anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII makes no similar declaration. See generally § 2000e-3(a). Thus,
according to the Fifth Circuit, the anti-retaliation provision could "only be read to exclude
such vague harms [(like those accounted for in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2))], and to include
only ultimate employment decisions." Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709.
39. Id. at 707 (quoting Dollis, 77 F.3d at 782); see also Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227,
233 (4th Cir. 1981) (setting out the criteria for an ultimate employment decision). Ironi-
cally, while the Fourth Circuit opinion in Page spawned these categories of ultimate em-
ployment decisions, the Fourth Circuit emphatically denounced the ultimate employment
[Vol. 56:715
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employee's problems did not constitute retaliation.40 Though the em-
ployee might suffer retaliation in the future, the mere possibility of such
an action did not equate to an ultimate employment d4
The Eighth Circuit adopted a strict approach for showing adverse em-
ployment actions in Ledergerber v. Stangler, where a supervisor alleged
retaliation by her employer in response to her opposition of a purported
policy giving preference to African American employees. The alleged
retaliation involved completely replacing the supervisor's staff.
43
The court found that "[w]hile the action complained of may have had a
tangential effect on her employment, it did not rise to the level of an ul-
timate employment decision intended to be actionable under Title VII."4
The court reasoned that employment actions that do not materially alter
the terms or conditions of employment are insufficient to show retalia-
tion.45 The supervisor failed to present evidence showing that the change
in staff makeup constituted retaliation, especially considering the super-
visor's pay, benefits, duties, job title, and office (essentially the terms and
conditions of employment) were not materially altered.46
decision test in favor of an intermediate approach utilizing a terms and conditions of em-
ployment test. See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858,865 (4th Cir. 2001).
40. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708.
41. Id. Here, "[t]he employee could only prove examples of the 'many interlocutory
or mediate decisions having no immediate effect upon employment conditions' which
therefore were 'not intended to fall within the direct proscriptions of ... Title VII."' Id.
(quoting Page, 645 F.2d at 233).
42. Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1997). The employee was a
director who investigated charges of racial discrimination. Id. Upon finding flawed hiring
practices and inconsistent equality policies, the director recommended changes in em-
ployment practices to address the racial tension in the office. Id.
43. Id. While the employee's entire four-person staff was replaced, the employee's
position, responsibilities, and staff size remained the same. Id.
44. Id. at 1144. The approach utilized by the Eighth Circuit should be deemed strict
because the court noted that Title VII intends "ultimate employment decisions" to be
actionable. Id. Nonetheless, it is significant that that Eighth Circuit explored the terms
and conditions of employment when analyzing the merits of a retaliatory adverse employ-
ment action. Id. at 1144-45. Exploration of the terms and conditions of employment (but
without the "ultimate employment decision" language) becomes vital under the intermedi-
ate approach to Title VII retaliation complaints. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865.
45. Ledergerber, 122 F.3d at 1144. But see Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958,
969 (8th Cir. 1999) (suggesting the Eighth Circuit would go beyond ultimate employment
decisions in determining retaliatory adverse employment actions under Title VII).
46. Ledergerber, 122 F.3d at 1144-45.
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
C. Intermediate Approach to Title VII Required a Change in the Terms,
Conditions, or Benefits of Employment
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits utilized an intermediate ap-
proach for determining claims of prohibited retaliation under Title VII.
This intermediate standard generally required a showing that the terms,
conditions, or benefits of employment had changed in order to establish
retaliation under Title VII. 48 The intermediate approach avoided pi-
geonholing the issue under the "ultimate employment decision" label,
but still required some proof that the alleged retaliation adversely af-
fected the scope of employment.
49
The Second Circuit adopted the intermediate approach to Title VII re-
taliation actions in Richardson v. New York Department of Correctional
Service, where an employee filed charges with the EEOC based on racial
discrimination and a hostile work environment.5 0 The employee alleged
retaliation when the employer took no action after a reported series of
harassing acts from co-workers and supervisors." The incidents had such
an adverse effect on the employee the she eventually required extensive
sick leave, which became so extreme that it caused a de facto resignation
52
under the terms of employment.
The court recognized that retaliatory harassment from co-workers,
when severe enough and ignored by the employer, may lead to a finding
of retaliatory adverse employment action by that employer. 3 The court
explained "that Title VII does not 'define adverse employment action
solely in terms of job termination or reduced wages and benefits."' In-
stead, the court examined whether the action adversely affected "the
terms and conditions of employment. '"55 In making this determination,
47. See Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865; Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv.,
180 F.3d 426,446 (2d Cir. 1999); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300-01 (3d
Cir. 1997).
48. See Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865.
49. See id.
50. Richardson, 180 F.3d at 434.
51. Id. at 445.
52. Id. at 435-36. In response to the continued hostile work environment, the em-
ployee felt the need to take a medical leave of absence to prevent additional mental and
emotional trauma. Id. at 435. She provided medical documentation for five months of
leave, but did not update that documentation for successive medical absences. Id With-
out this additional documentation to justify the entire medical leave of absence, the sick
leave was considered an unexcused absence, and she was deemed to have resigned under
the employment agreement. Id. at 435-36.
53. Id. at 446.
54. Id. (quoting Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir.
1997)).
55. Id. The court remarked that "'not every unpleasant matter short of [discharge or
demotion] creates a cause of action for retaliatory discharge."' Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Wanamaker, 108 F.3d at 466). The court went on to state that an employee suf-
[Vol. 56:715
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the court recognized the lack of a bright line rule and the need to ap-
proach each case independently to determine whether the facts rise to the
level of adverse employment action.56 Ultimately, the court decided that
"[a]n employee could suffer a materially adverse change in the terms and
conditions of her employment if her employer knew about but failed to
take action to abate retaliatory harassment inflicted by co-workers."57
The Third Circuit similarly adopted an intermediate approach to the is-
sue in Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, where a police officer filed sexual
harassment complaints with her employer as well as the EEOC.58 Robin-
son claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, sexual
harassment, quid pro quo sexual harassment, and retaliation. 9 Her re-
taliation claim involved a problematic working environment, which in-
cluded decreased work duties, reassignment, and refusal of her request to
transfer away from her harasser.60 Additionally, the alleged retaliation
consisted of unsubstantiated verbal criticisms and negative comments in
response to the actions Robinson took under Title VII.
61
The court found that for the actions to constitute retaliation, the "re-
taliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an em-
ployee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."62
fers employment retaliation when "she endures a 'materially adverse change in the terms
and conditions of employment."' Id. (quoting Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir.
1997)).
56. Id. Here, the court cites Wanamaker, which interpreted parallel provisions of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and recognized that "[b]ecause there
are no bright-line rules, courts must pore over each case to determine whether the chal-
lenged employment action reaches the level of 'adverse."' Wanamaker, 108 F.3d at 466.
57. Richardson, 180 F.3d at 446. The court likened this result of employer inaction to
employer negligence in racially and sexually hostile working environments. Id. In hostile
working environment cases, an employer is negligent for failure to take responsive action
when the employer knows, or should reasonably know, about harassment in a racially or
sexually hostile manner. Id. (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759
(1998); Kracunas v. Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1997)).
58. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1292 (3d Cir. 1997). According to
the employee:
[T]he harassment included unhooking her bra, snapping her bra strap, touching her
hair and ears, telling her "you stink pretty," making comments about the size of her
breasts, blowing her a kiss, asking her out for a drink, touching her leg under a table,
putting his hands around her waist, dropping his keys down the back of her shirt and
attempting to retrieve them, and describing the position in which he and Robinson
would have sex if they were to do so.
Id. at 1291.
59. Id. at 1292. After making the harassment charges, the employee ceased reporting
to work and apparently never returned. Id. Strangely enough, despite her absence, the
Pittsburgh police force subsequently promoted the employee from officer to sergeant. Id.
60. Id. at 1300.
61. Id. at 1300-01.
62. Id. at 1300. The court reached its conclusion by examining the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII and the surrounding statutes. Id. While 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
2007]
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The court held that the alleged derogatory comments and oral repri-
mands did not significantly affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of
employment, and thus the claims failed to "rise to the level of... [what
the court would consider] 'adverse employment action."' ' The court
likened the derogatory comments and oral reprimands similar to other
trivial, unsuccessful retaliation claims.6' The similarities were an impor-
tant factor in the court's decision to dismiss Robinson's claim for failure
to satisfy the "terms and conditions" test.6'
The Fourth Circuit's use of the intermediate approach appeared in Von
Gunten v. Maryland.66 In Von Gunten, an employee of the Maryland De-
partment of the Environment (MDE) complained of sexual harassment
in the workplace. 6' Von Gunten alleged that following her formal Title
VII complaint, she suffered retaliation from her supervisor and from her
co-workersi8 Specifically, the alleged retaliation involved poor employ-
ment evaluations, downgraded benefits, and an unhealthy working envi-
ronment. 69 She also claimed that she suffered retaliation because her
employer-issued vehicle was withdrawn, forcing her to use a personal
vehicle for work (for which she was reimbursed). 7 She further alleged
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate for taking action under Title VII, §
2000e-2(a) makes it unlawful for an employer:
[T]o fail or refuse to hire or ... otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment .. or
... to... deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300.
Accordingly, the court concluded that "conduct other than discharge or refusal to rehire
is thus proscribed by Title VII only if it alters the employee's 'compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment,' deprives him or her of 'employment opportunities,' or
'adversely affect[s] his [or her] status as an employee."' Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300 (al-
terations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)).
The court went on to discourage trivial and extraneous claims of employer retaliation:
"'[N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy' qualifies as retaliation, for
'[o]therwise, minor and even trivial employment actions that an irritable, chip-on-the-
shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit."' Id. (second
alteration in original) (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)).
63. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1301. Additionally, the court noted that much of the al-
leged retaliation actually occurred prior to the filing of the EEOC complaint, thus barring
a finding of retaliation for most of the allegations. Id. at 1301-02.
64. See id. at 1301. The court supported its holding by analogizing to retaliation
claims that were found "too intangible" or "involvfed a] small indirect effect on em-
ployee's earnings." Id.
65. Id.
66. 243 F.3d 858,865 (4th Cir. 2001).
67. Id. at 862.
68. Id. at 862-63.
69. See id. at 862.
70. Id.
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that she received a downgraded employment evaluation at the end of the
year, was given an unacceptable reassignment, and experienced a hostile
work environment filled with retaliatory treatment from co-workers.7'
The court specifically recognized that actions falling short of "ultimate
employment decisions" may be considered retaliation under Title VII.
72
The court found that retaliation cases require evidence showing that the
alleged retaliation "adversely effected [sic] 'the terms, conditions, or
benefits' of the plaintiff's employment." 73 In the end, the court concluded
that Von Gunten did not show that the employer's actions adversely af-
fected the terms, conditions, or benefits of her employment. 4 The court
found that her claims of retaliation were ultimately unpersuasive and had
little to no negative impact on the employee in the scope of her employ-
ment.75 In deciding that the retaliation claim lacked merit, the court
noted that the employer reimbursed Von Gunten for her personal vehicle
use, and soon gave her another state car and gasoline card.76 The court
also noted that she received a pay raise despite the downgraded evalua-
71. Id. at 862-63.
72. Id. at 865. The Fourth Circuit recognized and rejected the "ultimate employment
decision" test utilized in Mattern. See id.; Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702,
707 (5th Cir. 1997). In Mattern, the Fifth Circuit compared the broad protections offered
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 with the anti-retaliation provision of § 2000e-3 that "simply forbids
'discrimination' against 'any' employee." Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 864 (citing Mattern, 104
F.3d at 709). Based on this difference, the Fifth Circuit reached the conclusion that the
anti-retaliation provision only considered "ultimate employment decisions." Mattern, 104
F.3d at 709.
73. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865 (quoting Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc.,
126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)). Despite the textual distinction between the anti-
retaliation provision and the preceding section of Title VII, the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that "'conformity between the provisions of Title VII is to be preferred."' Id. (quoting
Ross v. Commc'n Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 1985)). Thus, the Fourth
Circuit opted for a broader interpretation of "discrimination" as found in the preceding
section of Title VII, over the strict "ultimate employment decision" model utilized by the
Fifth Circuit in Mattern. See id.
In Ross, an employee alleged employer retaliation due to a reduction of job "responsi-
bilities and professional status," a denial of salary and benefit raises, and supplying "false
information" to potential employers. Ross, 759 F.2d at 357. The court in Ross remanded
the retaliation claim for reconsideration of summary judgment for the employer. Id. at
363. Based partially on the remand in Ross, the Fourth Circuit recognized that acts of
retaliation falling short of "ultimate employment decisions" may constitute retaliatory
adverse employment actions. See Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865.
The Fourth Circuit went further to discuss its most recent Title VII retaliation case,
Munday v. Waste Management of North America, Inc. Id. In Munday, the Fourth Circuit
followed Ross, but denied a claim of retaliation, "not because those acts failed to rise to
the level [of] 'ultimate employment decisions,' but because Munday offered no evidence
that those acts 'adversely affected' the 'terms, conditions, or benefits' of her employment."
Id. (quoting Munday, 126 F.3d at 242).
74. Id. at 869-70.
75. Id. at 867-70.
76. Id. at 867.
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tion and obtained the only assignment available at the time of her reas-
17
signment request. Therefore, her hostile work environment claims were
not significant enough to materially affect the terms, conditions, or bene-
fits of her employment.78
D. The Broad Interpretation of Title VII Allowed a Case-by-Case
Approach
The majority of courts hearing Title VII retaliation cases utilized a
broad standard.79 This approach generally validated retaliation claims
where the alleged retaliation would deter employees from taking actions
protected under Title VII.80 The goal of this approach was to further the
purposes of Title VII and encourage employees to utilize the protections
available under Title VII. 81 While the broad approach was the majority
view among the federal circuit courts, it came in two varieties: some
courts applied a threshold test and found retaliation where the adverse
actions were severe or pervasive,8 while other courts applied a deter-
rence test and found retaliatory treatment in behavior that would deter
employees from taking action protected under Title VII0'
1. A Threshold Test: Adverse Actions Amount to Retaliatory Action
Under Title VII If Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive
The First Circuit in Noviello v. City of Boston decided what constitutes
retaliatory adverse employment actions.4 A parking enforcement officer
reported a case of sexual harassment to her supervisors' Following the
report, Noviello's co-workers ostracized her and subjected her to verbal
77. Id. at 867-68.
78. Id. at 869-70.
79. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 89-90 (1st Cir. 2005); Ray v. Hender-
son, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000); Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d
784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir.
1998); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998); Knox v.
Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).
80. See, e.g., Noviello, 398 F.3d at 90.
81. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (relying on the anti-
retaliation provision's primary goal of maintaining unfettered access to Title VII).
82. See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 89; Morris, 201 F.3d at 792; Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264;
Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334.
83. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243; Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456.
84. Noviello, 398 F.3d at 89.
85. Id. at 82. The initial alleged harassment consisted of the officer's superior forcibly
removing the officer's brassiere during work, and hanging the undergarment outside the
work vehicle. Id.
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assails.8 She filed a complaint with the EEOC, but the harassment con-
tinued. 7
The court held that when an employer allows the perpetuation of a
hostile work environment, it may be considered a retaliatory adverse
employment action under the anti-retaliation protections of Title VII.8
The court clarified "that workplace harassment, if sufficiently severe or
pervasive, may in and of itself constitute an adverse employment action
sufficient ... for Title VII retaliation cases." 9 The court also observed
that the EEOC takes a similar stance.9° Although the court justified the
86. Id. at 82-83.
87. Id. at 83. Examples of the continued retaliatory harassment included a co-worker
threatening that Noviello's "pay-day" was drawing near, and a co-worker violating de-
partment policy in order to abandon the employee while on her parking enforcement
route. Id.
88. Id. at 89. The court built upon a "totem pole" of previous decisions that suggested
co-worker harassment might constitute adverse employment action. Id.; see Wyatt v. City
of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (discussing in dicta the possibility
of employee harassment constituting adverse employment action); see also Che v. Mass.
Bay Trans. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (approving the co-worker harassment
discussion from Wyatt); Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 26 (1st Cir. 2002) (ap-
proving the co-worker harassment discussion); White v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 221 F.3d 254,
262 (1st Cir. 2000) (approving the use of the Wyatt dicta); Hernandez-Torres v. Interconti-
nental Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43,47 (1st Cir. 1998) (paraphrasing dictum in Wyatt).
In discussing the so-called "totem pole" that the court in Noviello used to reach its
conclusion regarding hostile working environments as retaliation, it should be noted that
the Wyatt dicta relied on an employment discrimination treatise. See Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15-
16. The court stated that "[i]n addition to discharges, other adverse actions are covered by
§ 2000e-3(a)." Id. at 15. Citing a treatise, the court noted in a parenthetical that "em-
ployer actions such as demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to
promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations and toleration of harassment by other
employees" are covered. See id. at 15-16; 2 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 34.04(3) (2d ed. 2006).
89. Noviello, 398 F.3d at 89. In reaching this conclusion, the court also noted "Con-
gress's intention 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or
abusive environment."' Id. at 89-90 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993)). Based on this intent of Congress, the court opted to construe 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) broadly to include hostile working environment in the definition of discrimination.
Id.
Then the court addressed the retaliation provision of Title VII, which guards against
employer discrimination "because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). The court observed that the term "discriminate" is not
preceded by any qualifier. Noviello, 398 F.3d at 90. Thus, the court interpreted the term
"discriminate" similar to its meaning in the previous section of Title VII. Id. (citing
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) (discussing the canon of construction for
applying the same construction to terms that appear in numerous places in a statute)).
Therefore, the court found that "the verb 'discriminate' in the anti-retaliation clause in-
cludes subjecting a person to a hostile work environment." Id.
90. Noviello, 398 F.3d at 90. The EEOC contends that a lack of a qualifier for the
term "discriminate" in the anti-retaliation provision nonetheless shows an intent to "'pro-
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holding on "severe or pervasive" grounds," the First Circuit further rec-
ognized the importance of guaranteeing access to remedies available un-
der Title VII, noting that co-worker hostility toward an employee for
reporting discrimination is a paradigm of retaliatory adverse employment
action and may deter similarly situated employees from utilizing protec-
tions afforded under Title VII protections.9'
The Sixth Circuit adopted a broad approach in Morris v. Oldham
County Fiscal Court, where an employee reported quid pro quo and hos-
tile environment sexual harassment from her supervisor.93 After making
the allegations, Morris continued to experience harassment including
several unwanted visits and over thirty telephone calls, allegedly for the
sole purpose of harassment. 94 The harassment eventually caused the em-
ployee to suffer from anxiety attacks and feel the need to use extensive
sick leave, rendering her unable to return to work full time.95
The court held that the supervisor's retaliatory harassment was action-
able under Title VII.96 The court examined the Supreme Court's holding
on a separate Title VII matter finding that "severe or pervasive harass-
ment by a supervisor ... can constitute 'discrimination.' 97 Accordingly,
hibit any discrimination that is reasonably likely to deter protected activity."' Id. (quoting
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II.D.3
(1998)).
Regarding the EEOC's position, the First Circuit acknowledged that administrative
interpretations, though not controlling, are entitled to some deference. Id. Here the court
applied Skidmore deference, and not Chevron deference. Id. at 90 n.3; see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The court noted that the EEOC manual is neither
adjudicatory nor a rulemaking, and should receive "deference only to the extent that [it
has] the power to persuade." Noviello, 398 F.3d at 90 n.3 (citing Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
91. Noviello, 398 F.3d at 89.
92. Id. at 90. The First Circuit stated that "severe or pervasive" workplace harass-
ment "may in and of itself constitute an adverse employment action sufficient to satisfy the
second prong of the prima facie case for Title VII retaliation cases." Id. at 89. The court
qualified the discussion of preserving access to Title VII remedies with the introduction:
"If more were needed-and we doubt that it is .... Id. at 90.
93. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784,787 (6th Cir. 2000).
94. Id. In addition to the numerous visits and phone calls, the employee alleged that
her workplace harasser sat in his vehicle outside her window at work and made "faces at
her," followed her home from work and made an inappropriate hand gesture, destroyed a
workplace television she used, and placed roofing nails in her driveway on multiple occa-
sions. Id.
95. Id. Despite the extended use of leave, the employer held the employee's job open
throughout the judicial proceedings. Id.
96. Id. at 791.
97. Id. at 791-92; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,751-52 (1998)
(using the "severe or pervasive" language). The Sixth Circuit stated that "[t]he basis for
our decision lies in a common rule of statutory construction: namely, that '[a] term appear-
ing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it ap-
pears."' Morris, 201 F.3d at 791 (second alteration in original) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United
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the Sixth Circuit applied this finding to retaliation cases, holding that
"severe or pervasive supervisor harassment that is engaged in because an
individual 'has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment prac-
tice by' Title VII also can constitute 'discrimination."' 9 In Morris, the
court determined the harassment went beyond "simple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents," 99 and was severe and pervasive
enough to constitute retaliation)°°
The Seventh Circuit also applied a broad standard in determining what
constitutes retaliatory adverse employment actions.' In Knox v. Indi-
ana, a correctional officer complained of sexual harassment by her super-
visor.1 l The supervisor was allegedly angry about the harassment charge
and reported the occurrence to co-workers.' 3 Knox's co-workers, friends
of the supervisor, began insulting and demeaning Knox in the presence of
prison inmates.""' In fact, her co-workers "made it known that they in-
tended to make Knox's life 'hell. 105  Knox subsequently brought suit
States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994)). Therefore, since severe or pervasive harassment from
one's supervisor can constitute discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), that "se-
vere or pervasive" standard should also apply to the subsequent anti-retaliation provision
found in § 2000e-3(a). Id. at 791-92 (extending the Supreme Court decision in Ellerth to
the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII).
For further discussion of the Ellerth case and its impact on Title VII retaliation cases,
see generally Ann M. Henry, Comment, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regard-
ing Retaliation under the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 553,
580 (1999) (discussing a two-prong affirmative defense for employers facing a claim of
Title VII retaliation).
98. Morris, 201 F.3d at 792 (quoting from the statutory language of Title VII).
Based on its holding, the Sixth Circuit in Morris modified the standard for making a prima
facie claim of retaliation under Title VII. Id. Consequently, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) this exercise of protected rights
was known to defendant; (3) defendant thereafter took adverse employment action
against the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory har-
assment by a supervisor, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action or harassment.
Id.
99. Id. at 793.
100. Id.
101. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).
102. Id. at 1330. The initial harassment consisted of the employee's supervisor sending
electronic mail messages propositioning the employee for sex, and repeatedly asking for
dates despite Knox's continued rejections. Id. Knox's supervisor then threatened her with
a shift change. Id. The harassment became so pervasive that co-workers began encourag-
ing the employee to commence an illicit relationship with the supervisor despite her con-
tinued rebuffs. Id.
103. Id. at 1331.
104. Id.
105. Id. Despite the ominous threats from co-workers, the prison's affirmative action
officer refused to take any protective action until the employee submitted a formal list of
harassing persons. Id.
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claiming retaliation in addition to her original employment discrimina-
tion complaints. 6
The court took a broad, sweeping approach'O° and noted that "adverse
actions can come in many shapes and sizes. No one would question the
retaliatory effect of many actions that put the complainant in a more un-
friendly working environment."'0° Regarding inaction by the employer,
the court said that allowing co-workers to initiate and continue punish-
ment in response to the employee's invocation of Title VII remedies con-
stituted retaliation under the statute.' 9 The court rationalized the use of
this broad approach to determine retaliation under Title VII, comment-
ing that "[t]he law deliberately does not take a 'laundry list' approach to
retaliation, because unfortunately its forms are as varied as the human
imagination will permit. ' '
The Tenth Circuit also interpreted the adverse employment action pro-
visions of Title VII broadly."' In Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, a
secretary complained of sexual harassment. The harassment subsided,
but Gunnell claimed that she experienced retaliatory treatment from co-
workers for making the initial complaint, as well as downgrades in the
quality and scope of her employment. The employer eventually put her
on probation and finally terminated her, citing her poor attitude and
workplace conduct.14
106. Id. at 1331-32.
107. Id at 1334. The Seventh Circuit remarked, "nothing in the law of retaliation...
restricts the type of retaliatory act that might be visited upon an employee who seeks to
invoke her rights by filing a complaint. It need only be an adverse employment action."
Id.; see also McKenzie v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 486 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing
whether a retaliatory action must be job related); Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437,
441 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing the Seventh Circuit's broad interpretation of adverse
employment actions).
108. Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334 (citation omitted). As examples of such unfriendly working
environments, the court considered "actions like moving the person from a spacious,
brightly lit office to a dingy closet, depriving the person of previously available support
services (like secretarial help or a desktop computer), or cutting off challenging assign-
ments." Id.
109. See id.
110. Id. Thus, the court found it was appropriate for a jury to examine the record in its
entirety to determine whether the employer retaliated "by sitting on its hands in the face
of the campaign of co-worker harassment about which it knew." Id. at 1334-35.
111. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998).
112. Id. at 1257.
113. Id. The alleged retaliation complaint involved the receipt of inferior office prod-
ucts and less job responsibility, in addition to retaliatory treatment from co-workers. Id.
114. Id. at 1258. The employee's probation and termination stemmed from making
notes concerning co-workers during the workday and creating an unproductive work at-
mosphere through complaints and non-cooperation. Id.
[Vol. 56:715
A Bridge Too Far
The court avoided establishing a specific test for determining what ac-
tions constitute retaliation,"' and instead recognized "'a case-by-case
approach' for deciding Title VII retaliation cases."' Under these guide-
lines, the court found "that co-worker hostility or harassment, if suffi-
ciently severe, may constitute 'adverse employment action' for purposes
of a retaliation claim."" Under this standard, the court doubted the ac-
tions were sufficient to support a retaliation claim as they seemed to in-
volve mere cases of rudeness, and were "'ordinary tribulations of the
workplace.'.. 18
2. The Second Approach: A Deterrence Test: Whether the Action Would
Deter Other Employees from Seeking Title VII Remedies
The Ninth Circuit adopted a broad standard for defining retaliation in
Title VII actions, focusing on the deterrent effect instead of the "severe
or pervasive test. 1 9 In Ray v. Henderson, an employee made complaints
about gender bias in the workplace 20 The employee alleged that in re-
sponse to these complaints, his supervisors retaliated by eliminating em-
ployee programs, by ending flexible work policies utilized by the em-
115. Id. at 1264. The Tenth Circuit began, however, with a survey of how its "sister
circuits have narrowly defined the term 'adverse employment action[s]."' Id. The court
observed a strict approach in the Fourth (Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126
F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)), Fifth (Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th
Cir. 1997)), and Eighth (Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997))
Circuits. Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264. On the other hand, the court recognized that some
circuits adopt a more lenient approach when considering co-worker harassment as an
adverse employment action. Id. (citing Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996);
Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam)).
The Tenth Circuit's categorization of the Fourth Circuit's position as a strict interpreter
of adverse employment actions ultimately proved false. See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243
F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001).
116. Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264 (quoting Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 1231-32 (10th
Cir. 1998)). For example, in Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, the Tenth Circuit found mali-
cious prosecution sufficient to support a finding of retaliatory adverse employment action.
Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986-87 (10th Cir. 1996).
117. Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264. Additionally, the court established general guidelines
for determining when co-worker hostility may be considered intentional employer retalia-
tion. Id. at 1265. On this issue, the court held that "an employer can only be liable for co-
workers' retaliatory harassment where its supervisory or management personnel either (1)
orchestrate the harassment or (2) know about the harassment and acquiesce in it in such a
manner as to condone and encourage the co-workers' actions." Id. The court refused to
extend liability for co-worker retaliation when management or supervisors were unaware
of the co-worker retaliation. Id.
118. Id. at 1265 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
119. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000).
120. Id. at 1237. The employee, a male postal carrier in rural California, along with
other co-workers, complained based on apparent harassment and bias against female co-
workers at the post office. Id.
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ployee, and by causing a disproportionate decrease in pay compared to
decreases suffered by other employees.'
The Ninth Circuit first recognized "that a wide array of disadvanta-
geous changes in the workplace constitute adverse employment ac-
tions.' '22 The court relied on the EEOC interpretation of "adverse em-
ployment action."' 3 Adopting the EEOC standard, the court held "an
action is cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably
likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity."' 2 In this
case, the court found the alleged retaliation sufficient under Title VII.2'
The court concluded that the retaliatory actions lowered the employee's
121. Id. at 1238-39. The employee's supervisor revoked employee involvement pro-
grams, as well as a flexible "self-management" policy, which forced the employee to work
at breakneck speed in order to complete his route. Id. at 1238. Additionally, the postal
routes for all carriers received cuts, but the complaining employee received the biggest cut,
which resulted in a decrease in pay. Id. at 1239.
122. Id. at 1240; see also Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997) (pro-
viding a negative job reference constitutes adverse retaliation "because it was a 'personnel
action' motivated by retaliatory animus"); Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79
F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[M]ere ostracism in the workplace is not enough to show an
adverse employment decision." However, an employee who was excluded from meetings
and positions that would allow merit pay increases, given a heavier work schedule, and
"denied secretarial support" may properly be said to have suffered a retaliatory adverse
employment action); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Transfers
of job duties and undeserved performance ratings, if proven, would constitute 'adverse
employment decisions .... ").
123. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242-43 (using EEOC compliance manual as guidance). The
EEOC Compliance Manual discusses the scope of retaliatory adverse employment actions
under Title VII. See generally EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8 (1998). According to the manual, "[tihe most obvious types of
retaliation are denial of promotion, refusal to hire, denial of job benefits, demotion, sus-
pension, and discharge. Other types of adverse actions include threats, reprimands, nega-
tive evaluations, harassment, or other adverse treatment." Id. § 8-II(D)(1).
The manual explicitly promotes adoption of a broad interpretation of retaliatory ad-
verse employment actions. Id. § 8-II(D)(3). The manual states that "statutory retaliation
clauses prohibit any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is rea-
sonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity."
Id. The manual concedes that "petty slights and trivial annoyances are not actionable."
Id. The EEOC invokes the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. in pro-
moting the broad approach, noting that "the primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provi-
sions ... is to '[mjaintain[] unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms."' Id. (al-
terations in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 338 (1997)); see also
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that EEOC guidelines, while
not binding, may be used by courts as guidance).
124. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. The court also found support in the text of the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII. Id. Title VII's anti-retaliation provision only prohibits
retaliatory "discrimination" against an employee for partaking in Title VII protected activ-
ity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. The Ninth Circuit found the
lack of a qualifier for the word "discriminate" telling, and remarked "[tlhis provision does
not limit what type of discrimination is covered, nor does it prescribe a minimum level of
severity for actionable discrimination." Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243.
125. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1244.
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compensation, forced the employee to complete the same amount of
work in a shorter span of time, and decreased the employee's influence
on employment policy.'2 These results "were reasonably likely to deter
Ray or other employees from complaining about discrimination in the
workplace."'27
The Eleventh Circuit similarly adopted a deterrent-focused approach
to the issue of Title VII retaliation. 12 8 In Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., an employee filed charges of racial discrimination with the EEOC.2 9
After filing the charges, the employee claimed to have suffered material
disadvantages to the terms and conditions of her employment, including
undeserved disciplinary action, administrative errors concerning her
work status, and even threats of physical violence by one of the store's
assistant managers.13
The court held "that Title VII's protection against retaliatory discrimi-
nation extend[ed] to adverse actions which fall short of ultimate employ-
ment decisions. 13' The court adopted a plain language approach to in-
terpreting the retaliation provision of Title VII.3 2 The court found that
the ordinary understanding of "discriminate" in the retaliation statute is
not restricted to "ultimate employment decisions. '""' Additionally, the
court recognized the importance of protecting the remedial purpose of
Title VII, remarking that an ultimate employment decision standard
"could stifle employees' willingness to file charges of discrimination. '' 14
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998).
129. Id. at 1455. The alleged discrimination involved discriminatory remarks, a pay
cut, and a statement from the employee's manager reporting that a certain position "would
not be filled by a black person." Id.
130. Id. The employee reported a laundry list of alleged retaliatory actions by her
employer and supervisors: (1) she was marked absent on her day off; (2) supervisors re-
quired her to work on her day off without a lunch break; (3) she received reprimands and a
one-day suspension despite no previous infractions; (4) her supervisor solicited co-workers
for negative remarks about the employee; (5) an assistant manager "threatened to shoot
her in the head"; and (6) managerial authorization of medical attention was delayed when
the employee suffered an allergic reaction at work. Id.
131. Id. at 1456 (finding assistance in the holdings of the First, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits, which found the anti-retaliation provision to protect against employer retaliation
falling short of so-called "ultimate employment decisions").
132. Id.
133. Id. ("Read in the light of ordinary understanding, the term 'discriminate' is not
limited to 'ultimate employment decisions.' Moreover, our plain language interpretation
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) is consistent with Title VII's remedial purpose.").
134. Id. The court stated, "[p]ermitting employers to discriminate against an employee
who files a charge of discrimination so long as the retaliatory discrimination does not con-
stitute an ultimate employment action, could stifle employees' willingness to file charges of
discrimination." Id.
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The D.C. Circuit also adopted a broad deterrence test to retaliation
claims under Title VII In Rochon v. Gonzales, an FBI employee al-
leged discrimination and retaliation in connection with the Bureau's re-
fusal to investigate a federal prisoner's threats against the employee and
his wife.16 Although FBI policy called for investigation into the threats,
and the FBI field office promised to do so, no action was taken.37
The D.C. Circuit previously interpreted an analogous retaliation provi-
sion in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act3 8 and opted for a
broad interpretation of "discrimination.' '139 The court imported that deci-
sion into the Title VII context, and adopted the rule that "a plaintiff must
demonstrate the 'employer's challenged action would have been material
to a reasonable employee,' which in this context means it well might have
'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination."" 4 Ultimately, the court found it was an error to dismiss
the employee's retaliation complaint on the facts alleged.
41
II. THE SUPREME COURT ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY INTERPRETATION OF
THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION WITH BURLINGTON NORTHERN &
SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. V. WHITE (BURLINGTON III)
Sheila White was the only female at the Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railway Company's Tennessee Yard.' 2 White held the position of
track laborer.' The job description included "removing and replacing
track components, transporting track material, cutting brush, and clearing
litter and cargo spillage from the right-of-way."' 44 Not long after the be-
ginning of White's employment, her supervisor assigned her forklift op-
135. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1213-14.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000).
139. See Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
140. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d
658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)). The court dismissed any notion that such a broad holding would
flood the courts with Title VII retaliation claims. Id. ("[W]e think making actionable in-
significant disparities in the treatment of employees of different races, or religions, et cet-
era, is too absurd to be attributed to the Congress. Such suits are properly precluded,
however, not by the court creating an atextual loophole for forms of retaliation unrelated
to the plaintiff's employment, but by our requiring that the alleged retaliation be 'material'
or 'significant."').
141. Id. at 1220 ("[A] reasonable FBI agent well might be dissuaded from engaging in
activity protected by Title VII if he knew that doing so would leave him unprotected by the
FBI in the face of threats against him or his family.").
142. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White (Burlington 111), 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409
(2006).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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erations as her primary duty.145 Within a few months, White complained
to company officials about disparaging remarks from her immediate su-
pervisor.146 The immediate supervisor allegedly told White that women
should not work in the department and "made insulting and inappropri-
ate remarks to her in front of her male colleagues.', 147 The company sub-
sequently suspended the supervisor, but White was also removed from
forklift duties and put on standard track laborer work assignments.
1
4
According to another supervisor, "the reassignment reflected co-worker's
[sic] complaints that, in fairness, a 'more senior man' should have the 'less
arduous and cleaner job' of forklift operator."'149
After this transfer, White filed a complaint with the EEOC claiming
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of gender.'o White went on to
file additional retaliation claims after being placed under surveillance and
suspended for disagreeing with another supervisor."' White exhausted
her administrative remedies and then filed the Title VII claim in federal
court arguing that the change in job duties as well as the later suspension
constituted impermissible retaliation under Title VII.' 2
At trial, White succeeded in both claims and received a jury award of
$43,500 in compensatory damages."" Later, the Sixth Circuit reversed the
judgment.14 The Sixth Circuit, however, reheard the case en banc."' On
rehearing, the full court of appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment in
favor of White.'56 Observing the circuit split on what standard to apply in
Title VII retaliation cases, the Supreme Court granted certiorari .
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 364 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir.
2004), aff d, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2409-10.
153. Id. at 2410.
154. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. (Burlington 1), 310 F.3d 443, 455 (6th Cir.
2002), affd in part and remanded, 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), affd, 126 S. Ct.
2405 (2006). The court in Burlington I reasoned that "[w]e fail to see how White suffered
an adverse employment action by being directed to do a job duty for which Burlington
Northern hired her," and "Burlington Northern ultimately reversed White's suspension
and reinstated her with full back pay and overtime." Id. at 451,454.
155. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. (Burlington I1), 364 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir.
2004) (en banc), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). According to the Sixth Circuit, "[a] reas-
signment without salary or work hour changes ... may be an adverse employment action if
it constitutes a demotion evidenced by 'a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,
significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a
particular situation."' Id. at 797 (citation omitted).
156. Id. at 791.
157. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 797 (2005).
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The Court began its analysis by examining the anti-discrimination and
anti-retaliation provisions found in Title VII." 'The Court observed that
the anti-discrimination provision limits the scope of included actions with
the words "hire," "discharge," "compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment," "employment opportunities," and "status as an
employee."'59  These "limiting words" do not appear in the anti-
retaliation provision."W This difference in language led the Court to infer
that the limiting words were intentionally excluded from the anti-
retaliation provision."' The Court rationalized this inference by noting
the purpose of each provision:
The anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where indi-
viduals are not discriminated against because of their racial, eth-
nic, religious, or gender-based status. The anti-retaliation provi-
sion seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an em-
ployer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guar-
antees.162
The majority also argued that limiting anti-retaliation actions to in-
cidents in the work environment forecloses remedy for the broad
range of retaliation that may occur outside the work environment. 1
The Court noted that failing to allow broad construction of the anti-
retaliation provision would inhibit the primary purpose of the law:
"maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms."' 64
When it came to establishing the test for anti-retaliation cases, the
Court stated, "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materially adverse, 'which in this con-
text means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from mak-
ing or supporting a charge of discrimination. ' ' 66
The Court, however, attempted to mitigate this broad stance! 66 First,
the Court used the term "material adversity," which allegedly will act as a
filter against "trivial harms.', 167 Second, the Court sought to add strength
158. Burlington III, 126 S. Ct. at 2411-12.
159. Id. at 2411.
160. Id. at 2412; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
161. Burlington III, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
163. Id. (citing two federal circuit court cases); see Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211,
1213 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (involving employer's refusal to investigate death threats made
against FBI agent and spouse); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir.
1996) (involving employer that falsely filed criminal charges against employee).
164. Burlington III, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
165. Id. at 2415 (quoting Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219).
166. See id.
167. Id. The Court observed that "petty slights or minor annoyances" are unavoidable
for employees taking action under Title VII. Id. For a discussion of such "trivial harms"
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to the nebulous deterrence test with a reference to a so-called "reason-
able worker," supposedly giving the test an objective basis'
The Court applied this interpretation of Title VII's anti-retaliation
clause to White's case against Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
169 170Company.' 69 The Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's en banc decision.
White produced sufficient evidence of retaliation to support a jury verdict
against her employer under Title VII.1
71
While the Justices reached a unanimous decision, Justice Alito penned
a concurrence raising concerns with the efficacy of the majority opin-
ion. Initially, Justice Alito questioned the Court's statutory construc-
tion of Title VII. 173 While the majority found significance in the linguistic
differences in the anti-discrimination and the anti-retaliation provisions
of Title VII, Justice Alito preferred reading the two sections of the Act
together.74 Therefore, "discriminate" under the anti-retaliation provision
is consistent with references to "discriminate" under the anti-
discrimination provision. 75 Justice Alito favored such an interpretation
as it harmonized the neighboring sections of the statute.76
Next, Justice Alito criticized the majority's concern with retaliation oc-
curring outside the work environment. 77 Justice Alito suggested that
employees who wish to retaliate against employees are more likely to do
so within the scope of employment.178 Additionally, a narrower "terms
and conditions" analysis would still be broad enough to encompass po-
tential retaliation outside the workplace. 79 Thus, it was not necessary for
the Court to adopt such a broad ayproach in order to protect employees
inside and outside the workplace.'
cited by the Court, see 1 B. LINDEMANN & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 669 (3d ed. 1996).
168. Burlington III, 126 S. Ct. at 2415-16.
169. Id. at 2416.
170. Id. at 2418.
171. Id. at 2416-18.
172. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., concurring). Prior to becoming a Supreme Court Justice,
(then Judge) Alito issued an opinion on the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, while
sitting on the Third Circuit. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1291 (3d Cir.
1997). Justice Alito's majority opted for a terms and conditions test over the broader
approach eventually favored by the Supreme Court. Id. at 1300. In the Third Circuit opin-
ion, Justice Alito wrote, "retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter
an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Id.
173. Burlington II, 126 S. Ct. at 2418-19 (Alito, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 2419.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 2419-20.
178. Id. at 2419.
179. Id. at 2420.
180. Id. ("While surely one of the purposes of § 704(a) is to prevent employers from
engaging in retaliatory measures that dissuade employees from engaging in protected
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Later, Justice Alito debated the practical concerns with the majority's
decision.'8 ' By advocating a test based on whether a reasonable em-
ployee would be dissuaded from filing a claim, the Court effectively set
up a sliding scale."" Employees that experience mild discrimination, on
the other hand, will be dissuaded rather easily.83 Employees that experi-
ence severe discrimination, on the other hand, will only be dissuaded with
extreme forms of retaliation.184 According to the concurring Justice,
"[tihese topsy-turvy results make no sense."' Moreover, Justice Alito
expressed concern with the concept of a "reasonable worker," and de-
termining when it would be necessary to include particular characteristics
of a complaining employee.'
III. COURTS SHOULD EXERCISE DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE
B URLINGTON I DECISION TO RETALIATION CLAIMS
The Title VII anti-retaliation provision intends to prevent employers
from taking action against employees for utilizing Title VII protections,
because such retaliation would likely deter employees from making com-
plaints.' 7 With the Burlington III decision, the Supreme Court adopted
the deterrence test for evaluating employee claims under federal law.
88
The deterrence test generally finds retaliatory adverse employment ac-
tions where the complained-of events would discourage employees from
utilizing Title VII employment protections.'8 9
This broad test adopted by the Court has allowed a vast array of events
to be treated as retaliation. 9' As a result, access to Title VII remains un-
conduct, there is no reason to suppose that this is 704(a)'s only purpose.... another pur-
pose ... [is] 'to prevent harm to individuals' who assert their rights.").
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2420-21.
183. See id. at 2421.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id. Justice Alito specifically points to the majority's comment that, "the signifi-
cance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances."
Id.
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir.
2000) ("[Tlhe [deterrence] standard is consistent with our prior case law and effectuates
the language and purpose of Title VII ... an action is cognizable as an adverse employ-
ment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activ-
ity.").
188. Burlington III, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
189. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243 (agreeing with the EEOC opinion that qualifying re-
taliation consists of unfavorable treatment with a retaliatory purpose that is likely to dis-
suade similarly situated employees from taking protected activity).
190. See id. at 1243-44 (finding elimination of employee programs and flexible time
policy, as well as disproportionate decreases in pay and workload constituted retaliation);
Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding retaliation
in actions ranging from a denied lunch break to threats of physical violence).
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restricted since employees can seek redress for retaliation, regardless of
its form. 9' With increased access to Title VII remedies, however, comes
the potential for courts to be inundated with new Title VII retaliation
claims. 92
Additionally, the deterrence test creates the opportunity for retaliation
claims to reach the courts with only a tangential connection to the scope
of employment. 93 As Justice Alito noted in his concurrence, "[t]here is
reason to doubt that Congress meant to burden the federal courts with
claims involving relatively trivial differences in treatment.'94
Moreover, the deterrence test lacks the clarity of a bright line test-
determining what would deter an employee from taking protected action
is subject to judicial interpretation. 95 While the deterrence test allows
the flexibility needed to provide fair results under varied circumstances, it
lacks the stability necessary to put employers on notice of what actions
need to be prevented to avoid liability.96
191. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. Since the test is whether the action would deter em-
ployees from taking protected action, unfettered access to Title VII protections, as in-
tended by the statute, is a necessary result. Id. ("[Thel test focuses on the deterrent ef-
fects.... it effectuates the letter and the purpose of Title VII.").
192. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Gives Employees Broader Protection
Against Retaliation in Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A22. According to one
attorney, the Court's ruling will "lead to 'burdensome' litigation and was 'particularly
disappointing to small employers."' Id.
193. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243-44. A necessary evil of the broad approach is the possi-
bility of frivolous retaliation claims achieving success, especially with a deterrence test
subject to a judge's view of what would deter an employee from seeking Title VII protec-
tions. Id.; see also Burlington III, 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[The broad
interpretation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision] 'makes a federal case' out of any
small difference in the way an employee who has engaged in protected conduct is
treated.").
194. Burlington III, 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring).
195, See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. Judges must look forward and subjectively ask whether
the action "is reasonably likely to deter." Id. ("Instead of focusing on the ultimate effects
of each employment action, the.. . test focuses on the deterrent effects."). By shifting the
analysis away from the effect on the complaining employee, and toward the effect on simi-
larly situated employees, decisions using the deterrence standard become subjective and
abstract. See id.
196. See id. Under this approach, employers lack sufficient parameters concerning
what constitutes appropriate activity. See id. As a result, employers may find themselves
at the mercy of judicial discretion. See id. Courts must evaluate the individual facts of
each complaint and make a prospective determination of whether the complained-of ac-
tion would deter employees from taking protected action, and thus constitute retaliation
under Title VII. See id.; see also Carla J. Rozycki & David K. Haase, Supreme Court Eases
Standard for Title VII Retaliation Claims, LAW.COM, Aug. 2, 2006, www.law.com/
jsp/llf/PubArticleFriendlyLLF.jsp?id=154423136520 ("Employers faced with employees
who have filed discrimination charges will have to take greater care to assure that the
employee is not subject to any actions which could be viewed as retaliatory. Even before
the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington, management of employees who have filed
charges of discrimination has proven challenging to employers.").
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Additionally, the Court's rule may cause practical problems in applica-
tion. A terms and conditions test allows an objective standard to be ap-
plied.197 The Court's deterrence test, on the other hand, forces courts to
apply a sliding scale to determine when retaliation occurs.1 98 Moreover,
the scale is based on whether a quasi-reasonable employee would have
been dissuaded.'9
The terms and conditions test provides flexibility to examine charges of
unlawful retaliation200 without foreclosing channels of Title VII protec-
tion to employees seeking remedies.201 For example, an employee that is
moved from her spacious, private office to a shared broom closet the
week after reporting harassment has undoubtedly experienced a retalia-
tory adverse employment action.m Such action deserves redress, even
though it is not on the level of a pay decrease or termination.2 At the
same time, while an employee that becomes socially unpopular at work
197. Compare supra note 47 and accompanying text, with supra note 193 and accompa-
nying text, and infra note 198 and accompanying text.
198. See Burlington III, 126 S. Ct. at 2420-21 (Alito, J., concurring).
199. See id. at 2415 (majority opinion) (stating that the reasonable employee test is
"objective" and "avoids ... uncertainties").
200. Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001). The terms and condi-
tions test is preferable to the deterrence test: although the broad approach offers greater
flexibility by giving extensive judicial discretion, the terms and conditions test tempers
judicial discretion through the materiality standard. Compare id. ("[N]ecessary in all §
2000e-3 retaliation cases is evidence that the challenged discriminatory acts or harassment
adversely effected [sic] 'the terms, conditions, or benefits' of the plaintiff's employment."
(quoting Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997))), with
Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243 ("[A]n action is cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is
reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.").
201. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865. The terms and conditions test does not put a strict
limitation on retaliation claims like the ultimate employment decision test, and allows
exploration of possible cases of retaliation that do not directly relate to salary, promotions,
hiring, terminating, or granting leave. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702,
707 (5th Cir. 1997) (requiring an ultimate employment decision to cause the complained-of
adverse action).
202. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996). Without serious extenuating
circumstances, the proximity of the move and the filing of the harassment claim makes it
logical to assume such an action was taken in retaliation. In fact, in Knox v. Indiana, the
court stated, "[n]o one would question the retaliatory effect of ... actions like moving the
person from a spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy closet." Id.
Nonetheless, a new office is not considered an "ultimate employment decision." See
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707 (requiring an ultimate employment decision to cause the adverse
effect). The terms and conditions test, however, would examine the situation outside the
harsh construct of the ultimate employment decision test and would likely find a case of
retaliatory adverse employment action, despite the employer's novel approach to treating
employees after they file Title VII complaints with the EEOC. See Von Gunten, 243 F.3d
at 866.
203. See Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334. Courts adopting the terms and conditions test recog-
nize the need to protect employees in situations that go beyond the traditional aspects of
employment. See Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865 ("[Clonduct short of 'ultimate employment
decisions' can constitute adverse employment action for purposes of § 2000e-3.").
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following his invocation of Title VII protections has certainly experi-
enced a hardship, the loss of a social life is unlikely to meet the material-
ity required for finding retaliatory adverse employment actions under the
terms and conditions test.2
Although the terms and conditions test may allow some potentially
frivolous claims of employment retaliation, this intermediate approach
still requires the alleged retaliation to materially alter the terms, condi-
tions, or benefits of employment enough to warrant a finding of a Title
VII adverse employment action, thus providing a better filter for frivo-
lous claims than the Court's deterrence test.2 5 Furthermore, a terms and
conditions test provides a measure of certainty to both employees and
employers.2 Employers can be sure that frivolous retaliation claims will
be r)ected, since they will fail to reach the severe or pervasive thresh-
old. This places the employer on general notice as to what conduct
204. See id. A liberal interpretation of the broad approaches could possibly find such
ostracism in the workplace is reasonably likely to deter employees from filing Title VII
claims, and thus constitutes retaliatory adverse employment actions. See Ray, 217 F.3d at
1243 (recognizing retaliation occurs in actions that are reasonably likely to deter others
from utilizing Title VII protections). Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit, utilizing the broad
approach's deterrence test, has declined to recognize mere ostracism as employment re-
taliation under their deterrence test. See Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79
F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[Miere ostracism in the workplace is not enough to show an
adverse employment decision."). Still, the terms and conditions test is more likely to pre-
vent against such frivolous, tangential complaints by instituting the terms, conditions, or
benefits criteria. See Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866.
205. See Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865-66 (requiring an essential prerequisite of materi-
ality for retaliation claims). Citing the lower court, the Fourth Circuit stated, "'evidence
that the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment were adversely effected' [sic] is the
sine qua non of an 'adverse employment action."' Id. at 866 (quoting Von Gunten v. Md.
Dep't of the Env't, 68 F. Supp. 2d 654, 662 (D. Md. 1999)).
206. See id. at 866. Under the terms and conditions test, employers and employees
have a fair understanding of the level of conduct that courts will consider retaliatory ad-
verse employment actions. Id. ("terms, conditions, or benefits"). Though the terms and
conditions test does not provide the same level of certainty as the "ultimate employment
decision" model utilized in the strict approach (only a discrete list of actions will constitute
retaliation), the intermediate approach provides parameters for judicial discretion rather
than the prospective postulations relied upon under the broad approach's deterrence and
threshold tests. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 89 (1st Cir. 2005) (leaving
courts to decide whether retaliation is severe or pervasive); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243 (asking
courts to forecast the deterrent effects of the retaliation in question); Mattern, 104 F.3d at
707 (adopting a bright line rule concerning activities that constitute retaliation).
207. See Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866 (setting out the terms and conditions standard).
For a Title VII retaliation claim to succeed under the terms and conditions test, a court
must determine that the alleged retaliation, at a minimum, materially altered the terms,
conditions, or benefits of employment. See id. This requirement should derail frivolous or
tangential claims of retaliatory adverse employment action, thus providing employers
some piece of mind despite the notoriously litigious nature of American society. See
Charles Lane, Court Expands Right to Sue Over Retaliation on the Job, WASH. POST, June
23, 2006, at A16 ("'Justice Breyer's standard opens the door to claims based on actions
that before today companies would not have suspected were actionable .... Companies
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courts will consider retaliation.2"" In turn, employers will be able to skill-
fully monitor worklaces and take proactive action to prevent retaliation
before it happens.
The purposes of Title VII are enhanced by the terms and conditions
21 211test. 0 Applying a canon of statutory construction, terms should be
interpreted similarly throughout a statute. 12 Accordingly, the term "dis-
criminate" should be read similarly throughout Title VII.2 3 Thus, where
will have to be much more careful as to how they manage employees who are covered by
Title VII.' (quoting attorney Daniel P. Westman)); Mindy W. Toran, A Litigious World
Raises the Stakes for Employment Practices Liability, RISK & INS., Aug. 2003, at 37
("Companies that have the proper employment practices guidelines in place and make
their employees aware of those guidelines and what procedures they're to follow in the
event of a problem will generally fare better in defending themselves than companies that
remain uneducated about these issues.").
208. See Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866. Employers in a jurisdiction utilizing the terms
and conditions test have notice that retaliatory conduct against an employee following a
Title VII complaint will be deemed a retaliatory adverse employment action if such con-
duct materially impacts the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment enough to war-
rant such a judicial determination. See id. Moreover, consistent application of the terms
and conditions test will yield increasingly definite standards as to what actions will be con-
sidered to impact the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment. See id. at 865-66 (look-
ing to previous decisions for guidance on what activities should constitute Title VII retalia-
tion).
209. Cf. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999)
("An employee could suffer a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of her
employment if her employer knew about but failed to take action to abate retaliatory
harassment inflicted by co-workers.").
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). Title VII strives to eliminate workplace discrimi-
nation based on race, color, national origin, sex, or religion. Id. Title VII also protects
access to Title VII remedies by prohibiting retaliation against employees for taking pro-
tected action. § 2000e-3(a). As the Supreme Court has noted, the main purpose of the
anti-retaliation provision is to keep the channels of Title VII relief open and available to
employees without encumbrance. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)
(deciding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 applies to current as well as former employees).
211. See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 90 (applying a canon of construction to interpret the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII).
212. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) ("A term appearing in several
places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears."). But see
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("'[When] Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclu-
sion or exclusion."' (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.
1972))); Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age of Textualism: A Practitioner's
Guide to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. REV. 451, 451-52 (2001-
2002) ("Most battles of statutory interpretation play out like a fixed game of cards. One
party invokes the canon of statutory construction most supportive of its position. The
other party invokes a contrary canon of statutory interpretation supportive of its posi-
tion.").
213. See § 2000e-3(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has [taken action] under
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 provides a meaning for "discriminate, '214 it provides
guidance for interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision." 5 In fact, §
2000e-2 talks of "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,,
216
which further promotes adoption of a terms and conditions test for the
anti-retaliation provision.217 Although the limiting phrases found in the
anti-discrimination provision do not appear in the anti-retaliation provi-
sion, reading the sections together provides a unifying solution and sup-
ports the terms and conditions test. 8
When an employee is retaliated against for taking actions protected
under Title VII, a terms and conditions test will find liability wherever
the retaliation reaches the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment;
this test does not constrict findings of retaliation to the traditional meth-
ods of employer revenge, nor does it open the floodgates for retaliation
claims .2 9 This level of protection ensures that multiple forms of retalia-
this subchapter" (emphasis added)); see also Noviello, 398 F.3d at 90 (applying the canon
of construction to the word "discriminate" in Title VII). But see Mattern v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 709 (5th Cir. 1997) (inferring the omission of a definition of "dis-
criminate" implies a more limited use than provided elsewhere in the statute).
214. § 2000e-2. This provision of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
215. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 143. Using this canon of construction, the anti-retaliation
provision should import § 2000e-2's meaning of discrimination. See id. Thus, the term
"discriminate" as used in the anti-retaliation provision properly refers to "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." See § 2000e-2.
216. § 2000e-2.
217. See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 90. Despite the fact that the preceding section of Title
VII explicitly reads "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," multiple courts have
used the section to support adoption of a broad standard of interpretation. See id. (relying
on other sections of Title VII to interpret "discriminate," but adopting a broad, threshold
test); Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 791-92 (6th Cir. 2000) (extend-
ing a Supreme Court holding that severe or pervasive harassment can constitute "discrimi-
nation" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII).
218. See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 90; Morris, 201 F.3d at 791.
219. See Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996). Although the Seventh
Circuit uses a broad approach in interpreting the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, the
opinion from Knox is useful here. See id. ("The law deliberately does not take a 'laundry
list' approach to retaliation, because unfortunately its forms are as varied as the human
imagination will permit."); see also Linda M. Glover, Comment, Title VII Section 704(a)
Retaliation Claims: Turning a Blind Eye Toward Justice, 38 HOus. L. REV. 577, 612 (2001)
("The anti-retaliation provision is an enforcement mechanism. If courts allow employers
to recriminate, even in seemingly insignificant ways, against employees seeking the protec-
tion of Title VII, then the Act's protections are diminished."); cf. Rosalie Berger Levinson,
Parsing the Meaning of "Adverse Employment Action" in Title VII Disparate Treatment,
Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What Should be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56
OKLA. L. REV. 623, 653 (2003) (analogizing retaliation to the context of First Amendment
freedoms, where "minor retaliatory harassment may be actionable .... because ... less
harsh deprivations can also chill speech").
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
tion will be punished, thus protecting employee access to the basic pro-
tections allotted under Title VII.220
IV. CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington III, the anti-
discrimination provision of Title VII must be interpreted broadly to in-
clude employer actions that "'might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."'' 1 Despite this
broad mandate, courts should exercise discretion in their application of
Burlington III. In doing so, courts should obtain guidance from the now
abrogated "terms and conditions" test to prevent the inundation of frivo-
lous retaliation claims only tangentially related to employment. Failure
to exercise such discretion promises continued judicial struggles in apply-
ing the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.
220. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (extending the protections
offered under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII to former employees). According
to Justice Thomas, the "primary purpose of [the] antiretaliation provisions [is mlaintaining
unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms." Id. Justice Thomas is a former
Chairman of the EEOC. Supreme Court of the United States, Biographies of Current
Members of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/aboutlbiographies
current.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).
221. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White (Burlington III), 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415
(2006) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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